




















The recent legislative elections of May 2007 in Algeria have shown how 
complex the evolution of Islamist parties is in this country and how crucial 
an understanding of these mechanisms has become for Europe. Since 
the  civil war of the  1990s, Islamist parties have experienced increased 
political participation. Drawing on interviews with various Algerian Islamist 
actors, this paper analyses how Islamist parties are building a new 
relationship with democratic mechanisms in Europe. In light of these recent 
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POLITICAL ISLAM IN ALGERIA 
AMEL BOUBEKEUR* 
lgerian Islamist movements are some of the most heterogeneous in the Arab world. 
Algeria has a wide range of Islamist tendencies, illustrated by Islamist parties’ different 
strategies towards the state, civil society and external partners such as the European 
Union (EU). This paper will focus more specifically on the two major Islamist political parties 
in Algeria, the Movement of Society for Peace (Harakat al Moujtama’ As-Silm, MSP; formerly 
called Hamas) and the National Reform Movement (Harakat al-Islah al Watani or el-Islah, 
MNR). After having been founded clandestinely in the 1970s, these parties became components 
of the official Algerian opposition in the 1990s. This ‘officialising’ of some Islamist movements 
by the Algerian government occurred after the failure of revolutionary Islamist strategies, in 
particular those of the Islamic Salvation Front (al-Jabhat al-Islamiyya lil-Inqad, FIS) banned by 
the Algerian regime in 1992.
1 The MSP and MNR have adapted their ideology to the daily 
concerns of civil society, moving away from their previous revolutionary posture. This 
evolution demonstrates how Islamism as a social movement is today one of the most important 
forces for change in the region, having spread to different sectors such as trade unions, women’s 
associations, young people and students, and even networks of businessmen. 
By reporting on the views of Algerian Islamists towards European Union policies, this paper 
reinforces the need to understand the far reaching and complex dynamics of change within 
Islamism.
2 The views of Algerian Islamists reveal that the challenge of including Islamist 
movements in Euro-Mediterranean relations is not only related to the need for the EU to rethink 
its relations with specific political actors, but also to the EU’s capacity to propose a 
democratisation programme that is more credible for Arab civil society as a whole. 
The Evolution of the MSP and the MNR 
The MSP was created in 1990. The history of the MSP is closely linked to that of its founder, 
Mahfoudh Nahnah. Born in 1938, this teacher of Arabic started his preaching activities at the 
end of the 1970s and was an opponent of President Houari Boumedienne’s regime. In 1977, he 
carried out sabotage operations by demolishing electricity pylons and was sentenced to 15 years 
in prison. Pardoned by the following President, Chadli Bendjedid, Nahnah was then reported by 
various sources to have made a commitment to the security services to be less extreme in his 
preaching. He is also said to have promised to abstain from any association with Islamist groups 
which were critical of the authorities. 
Following the October 1988 Algiers youth riots, Nahnah was asked by Ali Benhadj, a young 
preacher, to take part in setting up the FIS. He refused and instead decided to create his own 
association – Guidance and Reform (Al-Irshad wa-l-Islah). This association was seen as a non-
political organisation for religious education, preaching and charity work that was largely 
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financed by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), with which Nahnah sympathised ideologically. In 
1990, the association became a political party under the name of Movement for an Islamic 
Society (Harakat li-Mujtama’ Islami, MSI; later Hamas). Its political activities were 
complemented by important social actions ranging from employment to helping families, 
assisting widows and the poor, as well as providing access to medical care. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Hamas has focused on cooperating with the state. Nahnah 
supported the government’s decision to interrupt the electoral process of 1992 (Hamas received 
only 5.3% of the votes during the legislative elections of 1991). During the 1990s the party 
condemned terrorist violence by the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS, the armed-wing of the FIS) 
as well as the repressive policies of the Algerian security services. This intermediary position 
cost Hamas the lives of nearly 50 senior party members, who were killed by terrorist acts. 
In 1995, Nahnah was invited by the Algerian regime to re-launch the democratic process and 
decided to take part in elections (especially the presidential ones), highlighting his strategy of 
participation in the official political process. He put himself forward as a candidate in the 1995 
presidential elections and officially won 25% of the votes, coming second to the Algerian 
army’s candidate, Liamine Zeroual. In 1997, following a law on political parties that banned 
any ideological use of Islam, Hamas  became the Movement of Society for Peace.  It then 
switched its slogan from ‘Islam is the solution’ to ‘Peace is the solution’. In the 1997 legislative 
elections, the MSP officially secured nearly 7% of the votes in parliament and 69 seats, 
becoming the fourth most powerful political party in the country. But the Algerian state did not 
give the MSP the opportunity to run in the 1999 presidential elections.  
Thus, since 1997, the MSP has been part of different government coalitions and is today a 
member of the Presidential Alliance, comprised of the MSP, the Algerian National Front 
(Jabhat at-Tahrir al-Watani, FLN) and the National Democratic Rally (at-Tajammu’ al-Watani 
ad-Dimuqrati, RND). But this policy of participatory strategies had negative consequences for 
the MSP as in the 2002 legislative elections it only won 7% of the votes and 38 seats, half the 
number of seats that it had in 1997. Mahfoud Nahnah died in 2003 and was replaced as party 
leader by Aboujerra Soltani. Since 2002, the MSP has held five ministerial portfolios – 
Mustapha Benbada, as Small and Medium-sized Businesses Minister; El Hachemi Djaaboub, as 
Industry Minister; Smaïl Mimoun, as Fisheries Minister; Amar Ghoul, as Minister of Public 
Works; and Aboujerra Soltani, as Minister of State without portfolio.
3 
The MNR was created in 1999 by Abdallah Djaballah. Born in 1956, Djaballah was among the 
first activists on Algerian campuses to begin spreading Islamism in its political form. After 
having studied Islamic sciences in Saudi Arabia in the 1970s,
4 Djaballah returned to Algeria 
where he presided over an Islamist association called Al Jama’a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic 
group). In 1990 he founded his own party – the Islamic Renaissance Movement (Harakat an-
Nahdha al-Islamiyya or an-Nahda). Even though close to the political perspectives of the FIS, 
Djaballah refused to be associated with its creation. Djaballah’s successive parties incorporated 
a high number of former FIS activists and voters after the latter’s prohibition in 1992.  
With an-Nahda, Djaballah won 34 seats during the legislative elections of 1997, becoming the 
fourth largest power in parliament. In 1998 he had to face the hostility of a large number of an-
Nahda’s activists who decided to expel him, following his refusal to be co-opted by the 
Algerian government. It was at this point that he created the MNR. Just before founding the 
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MNR, Djaballah had run for the presidential elections of 1999 as a free candidate, but decided 
with all the other opposition actors to withdraw from the electoral process before the vote. In the 
2002 legislative elections, the MNR became the third most powerful political force and the 
leader of the Islamist parties with 43 seats. Djaballah was again a candidate in the 2004 
presidential elections, finishing third with 5% of the votes.
5 
In sum, from starting as clandestine organisations with a revolutionary discourse, the MSP and 
MNR have transformed themselves into conservative pillars of Algerian society and the state. 
With a pro-nationalist stance, they are highly sensitive to the value given to the Islamic part of 
Algerian identity regarding the state and its institutions. They present themselves as defenders 
of the national Islamic characteristics of the country. They now insist that Algeria is already 
Islamic, toning down their demands for an Islamic state. A former MSP member of parliament 
for the region of Béjaïa argues: ‘Algeria is a Muslim country; the call for prayer can be heard, 
Ramadan is observed, women increasingly wear the veil, so talking about the Islamicisation of 
society when the country is already a Muslim country is a false problem’.  
State co-optation has led to a greater professionalisation of these parties, around the notion of 
musharaka (partnership).
6 They see themselves as embarking upon a practical apprenticeship of 
more day-to-day management and less revolutionary policy issues. The MNR supposedly 
represents the opposition to the more co-opted MSP, but aligns itself with the government when 
Islamic national identity is challenged, especially when political exchanges with the West occur. 
One MSP politician explains: 
We are currently in the presidential coalition, which means that we are no longer in the 
opposition. However, we are not exercising power as the two other parties (RND and FLN). 
We were obliged to take part in the democracy building process because the context was 




The MNR leader insists: 
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promising to return to the political scene soon at the head of a new party he would create. We should 
remember that Djaballah succeeded in making the MNR the second most powerful political force after the 
elections in 2002. The legislatives of May 2007 have recorded a historically low level of participation at 
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the RND. The new MNR led by Mohamed Boulahya has only secured 3 seats. The Algerian assembly 
numbers a total of 389 MPs. 
6 Hamladji (2002). 
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I am just positioning myself as an official Algerian party. When I am discussing EuroMed 
issues, I am doing it as an Algerian party, looking at issues which concern Algeria as a 
nation. They call us Islamists, but this is not a dialogue among religions that I am trying to 
manage! For me Islam is a complete system with its faith, economic, social, legal and 
political aspects. But I am doing it above all as an Algerian.
8 
The MNR has made alliances with clearly non-religious parties such as the Rally for Culture 
and Democracy (at-Tajammu’ min ‘ajl at-taqafah wad-Dimuqratiyya, RCD) and the Worker’s 
Party (Hizb al-‘Ummal, PT) which it then considered to be the only true opposition parties 
(apart from itself), after having said previously that secular parties were anti-constitutional − 
Islam being the religion of the Algerian State.  
One impact of this party professionalisation has been the weakening of ties with the grassroots. 
The two parties have lost their influence on the ground as Islamic associations.  With their 
support for the state’s national reconciliation initiative
9 they also under-estimated the size of the 
anti-state Islamist electorate, thought to be around four million people. This is worth noting 
when the EU seems keen to dialogue with Islamist parties based on the belief that they are 
representative of the masses; in practice, their principles and concept of membership are often 
very elitist. Faced with a process of more and more Islamists becoming middle class, many 
former activists are turning to Salafism.
10  
So, while the MSP and MNR have succeeded politically by accepting co-optation, many of their 
supporters still vote for them in protest at Western policies and state authoritarianism. The 
parties run political education programmes that the activists will not find elsewhere. They also 
organise meetings to comment on current news. Activists and supporters also see in these 
parties a socialising element which allows them to find a network of solidarity among members, 
helping them to get married, to set up businesses (via investment vehicles known as tontines) or 
to find accommodation. The parties also often benefit from the vote of activists from other 
banned Islamist parties, as was the case with some of the FIS votes going to the MNR in 2002. 
The process of professionalisation also obliged the MSP and the MNR to rethink the ‘grey 
zones’
11 of their policies with regards to democracy. How do you continue to be opponents and 
set yourself apart as Islamists, while at the same time playing the inclusion card? Instead of 
adopting a politically Islamist programme, these parties prefer to present themselves as 
defenders of Islamic virtue and morals. The MSP continues to be vague on the rights of 
religious minorities. It also took issue with the government decision to remove the teaching of 
the Koran from the baccalaureate. In 2004 the MNR proposed the law forbidding alcohol 
imports, and also opposed the revision of the Algerian family code, which aimed at giving more 
independence to women in family affairs: 
Our party is the target of those who want to impose an imported project of society to 
Algeria and who want the Westernisation of the nation. Our project of society is 
democratic. Islam and nationalism are its two main pillars.
12 
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This focus on morals is designed to win popularity among the masses, without frustrating 
strategies of alliance-building with the state. Thus, Menasra, the MSP’s second in command, 
explained that the party agrees with the RND when it comes to the economy because it 
advocates the opening of markets. Its differences with the FLN are a lot more to do with 
religion and freedoms. The MNR often allies with extreme left-wing parties in order to 
denounce election fraud, national resources privatisation or to defend lawyers’ independence 
and labour union’s rights. The political programmes of the MNR
13 and the MSP are imprecise, 
often supporting government policies while distinguishing themselves as ‘Islamic’. As 
professional and legalised parties, both organisations are re-thinking their place not only in their 
national context, but also with external actors such as the EU. They have increased contacts in 
Europe, where they often send representatives to present their programme, carry out interfaith 
dialogue and participate in discussions on Arab reform. 
Activities with European Muslims  
Algerian Islamists express strong interest in political action linked in one way or another to 
Europe. Their own presence in Europe is partly due to the fact that the scope for political action 
has been so limited within Algeria. After the interruption of the electoral process in 1992, many 
Islamist leaders, activists and supporters left the country and settled down in France, Great 
Britain, Germany and Belgium. In France, exiled members of the FIS created the Algerian 
Brotherhood of France (FAF).  
Islamists’ political struggle could be pursued via transnational opposition, representing a 
deterritorialisation
14 of Islamist activity from Algeria to Europe. Islamist movements used 
available political structures in Europe (through Islamic councils, the presence of imams in the 
local mosques, and by joining Islamic associations that already existed in Europe). Some former 
FIS activists became members of the Union of Islamic Organisations of France (Union des 
Organisations Islamiques de France, UOIF),
15 the main federation of Islamic associations in the 
country, and a pillar of the French Council of the Muslim Worship (Conseil Français du Culte 
Musulman, CFCM), which was created in 2003 with the support of the then Minister of the 
Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, to represent the interests of Muslims in France.  
Europe represented a land of exile for some Algerian Islamists, but also an opportunity to use 
European Islamic structures to defend Muslim minority rights. In the 1990s, Algerian Islamists 
decided to use associative frameworks rather than political parties for their activities on Islamic 
issues. These associations aimed at controlling the activities of a new type of activist – young 
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Muslims born in Europe. These associations led campaigns to integrate Muslims into the 
European political and social landscape, calling on them to join electoral lists and vote
16. 
The UOIF started off with an Islamist heritage but gradually shifted its activities to the defence 
and integration of Muslims in Europe. Founded in 1983 by a group of Tunisian and other 
Middle Eastern political refugees and Islamist students, the UOIF was destined to become the 
host organisation of exiled Islamists. Linked to the international Muslim Brotherhood, the UOIF 
initially had a strong Islamist tradition and had little interest in action in the host country. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, it changed direction, convinced of the relevance of and need for 
being active in France and Europe. The UOIF took up the cause of the young veiled students 
who were excluded from schools in 1989, organising demonstrations and alerting the media. It 
also tried to ban the publication in French of the Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie. More 
recently, it called on members of the Muslim community to mobilise through petitions, 
demonstrations and boycotts to bring an end to Islamophobic representations of the prophet 
Mohammed during the recent cartoon affair. Some MSP activists and supporters, such as 
Okacha Ben Ahmed, Secretary General of the UOIF, and Fethi Belabdelli, former president of 
the UOIF student section, known as the Muslim Students of France (EMF), were among the 
senior officials of the UOIF. With Algerian roots, they were active in Algeria through the 
General Free Students' Union (UGEL), which had close ties to the MSP, before moving to 
France to pursue their higher education. When they arrived in France, they continued their 
activism in the Muslim students’ association Muslim Students of France (EMF), present in 
twenty French universities. They then joined the management structures of the UOIF. Islamist 
parties were not present as such in Europe, preferring to work with cultural associations, either 
creating new associations, or joining existing organisations. 
Undermining the extent to which Algerian Islamist parties view Europe as a normative model, 
they are now mobilising from their home countries to defend European Muslims. During the 
33
rd session of foreign ministers of member countries of the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) in 2006, Aboujerra Soltani proposed setting up a mechanism to fight the 
Islamophobia he claims is rife in the West:  
Its aim is to bring Islamic states to pass laws to fight this phenomenon and work towards 
adopting a UN resolution to protect Islam and its symbols. The Algerian proposal calls for 
the creation of an Islamic fund to support efforts to combat Islamophobia in Western 
countries and to promote the values of dialogue and tolerance between cultures, religions 
and civilisations. It also puts the emphasis on the need for Islamic countries to impose 
economic boycotts against countries that encourage Islamophobia. The proposal sets out a 
series of measures – mobilisation of Muslim NGOs working in Europe and stepping up 
cooperation with the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE). It also advocates closer dialogue with political parties, decision-makers 
and NGOs to influence the content of school programmes that circulate a ‘distorted image’ 
of Islam passed from generation to generation.
17 
With more than a million Algerian nationals living in Europe, mainly in France, the MSP and 
MNR see these immigrants and their dual-nationality children as a significant pool of voters that 
can be mobilised during election campaigns. These parties’ election campaigns will therefore 
also be targeted at their compatriots living in Europe. In the words of an official from the MSP 
network in France: 
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There is a quota share of parliamentary seats reserved for Algerians in France. The 
authorities organise elections in the consulates to elect these MPs. So, in the MSP we target 
our campaign in France at Algerian nationals by distributing leaflets or organising little 
meetings. The aim is to woo the immigrant voters. We engage in politics here in France to 
win the elections; we try to have a network within the Algerian community in Europe. We 
also have a party representative in each consulate.  
In the case of the MSP, the idea is also to maintain the feeling of national belonging amongst 
Algerian nationals and to carry out a cultural development policy between the two countries. 
According to an MSP official: 
The MSP’s policy on immigration is to act as a bridge between the immigrants and their 
country of origin. We also want to take part in bringing France and Algeria closer together. 
Personally, I’ve tried to twin two towns – one Algerian and the other French – we have had 
meetings with French and Algerian doctors, researchers, etc. Having a network is really our 
first objective. All moderate Muslims in France and Algeria vote for us even if they are not 
members because they recognise themselves in our discourse. Now with the beurs [second-
generation North Africans living in France], it is true that it doesn’t really work for all 
Algerian parties. They are much more interested in French politics. We prefer that they take 
an interest in France but if they can do both that’s good. 
During the 1997 presidential elections, the MSP candidate Mahfoud Nahnah came first in the 
Algerian consulates of Strasbourg, Nice and Grenoble, well ahead of the candidate winning the 
presidential elections, Liamine Zeroual. Although dissolved since 1992, the FIS is also trying to 
orientate the votes of Algerians abroad. Rabah Kébir, head of the FIS executive delegation, who 
took refuge in Germany for a long time, called on Algerians to vote for Abdellaliz Bouteflika 
during the 2002 presidential elections. He also invited the different Islamists living in Europe to 
come to Algerian consulates abroad to benefit from a law on civil concord, promulgated in 
2000, whose aim was to grant amnesty to those responsible for crimes during the civil war. In 
short, Algerian Islamists’ views on what Europe should do are partly related to their own 
differing degrees of embeddedness within European policies.   
The Failure of Europe as a Democratic Model  
The bitterness over Algeria’s civil conflict in the 1990s and the fact that European governments 
largely supported the military regime’s harsh tactics against Islamists have ensured that 
Algerian Islamists have a particularly critical perspective of EU policies.  Unsurprisingly, the 
common view is that the EU actively collaborated in the repression of Algerian Islamists’ 
democratic rights. Significantly, this legacy from the 1990s can still be seen in Algerian 
Islamists’ views towards more recent EU initiatives. Interviews reveal that Algerian Islamists 
are particularly critical of new democracy promotion policies pursued under the EMP, decrying 
Europe's supposed determination to impose its own values through its cooperation programmes. 
Another frequent reproach by Islamists is that Europe should work to ensure respect for the 
rights of Muslims in Europe rather than try to influence the orientations of Muslim civil 
societies in the Arab world.
18 
The EU’s refusal to recognise the democratic electoral victory of Hamas in the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories has further undermined the credibility of EU discourse on democratisation 
amongst Algeria’s Islamists. Today, a number of Islamist party leaders and activists are 
considering the possibility of an ‘Islamic democracy’, that is, a democratic system inspired in 
large measure by the European democratic model and Islam, but with a distinctive set of beliefs 
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independent of Europe's ‘whims’.
19 During the interviews carried out for this chapter, the 
majority of Islamist players declared that they did not reject the possibility of becoming more 
democratic ‘thanks to Europe’ and its support, but not ‘like Europe’. What they dispute is the 
necessity of conforming to European demands and of acting in response to the democratisation 
programmes proposed by Europe – from which they are invariably excluded. Algerian Islamists 
also oppose what they judge to be Europe’s security objectives for promoting democracy. They 
believe this leads to a form of democracy promotion geared towards European allies’ stability, 
energy interests, counter-terrorism and the condition of amenability on Israeli-Palestinian 
issues. All this is seen as being to the detriment of high quality, genuine democracy, with direct 
effects on civil society and opposition parties (particularly through freedom of expression and 
access of the masses to the political sphere).  
The US and Europe are both criticised for wanting a democratisation of their own choosing, 
realising that the democratisation dynamics they have long been advocating will not necessarily 
produce the political result they are seeking for the stability of their dealings in the region.
20 
I was at this [European] conference and they were wondering how to be more efficient on 
the democratisation process in the region. Honestly, I was sceptical about their proposals as 
I saw how they support the undemocratic aspects of our governments, or with regards to 
their unfairness towards the Palestinian occupation or the Hamas victory! For these reasons 
I always prefer to talk about the need for a dialogue with the EU than for genuine 
cooperation.
21 
The EU’s disregard for cases of torture and abusive detention of Islamist activists, the exclusion 
of trade unions dominated by Islamists from Euro-Mediterranean networks, and the intercultural 
aspect given to inter-religious dialogue have also given credence to Algerian Islamists’ 
perception that the EU seeks to export a profoundly secular European conception of democracy, 
leaving very little room for the expression of religious identities. 
The West  was living in darkness while we had Andalusia, Al Qarawiyine [an Islamic 
university in Morocco]. They began to learn about justice, citizenship or even the 
relationship between people and the state when we had all this for 1,000 years! Why are 
they silent on the legacy of the ‘South’ in today’s Europe? What about St Augustine? What 
about Constantine I? Islam is dine wa daoula [religion and state affairs]. We cannot have 
religious beliefs [‘aqida] without a law [shari’a]. This is also the way Europe has been built, 
between faith and jurisdiction, and now they are going through a major identity crisis. I 
want them to talk about Islam from an Islamic perspective, not only from their own 
conception. I do not talk about democracy because it is already in my Islamic culture. 
Democratising a religious party [hizb dini] sounds strange to me! Thinking in terms of 
‘Islamism versus democratisation’ is the sign that the West refuses to understand my 
conception of governance, politics etc.
22 
Accordingly, the democratisation initiatives promoted by the EU seem no longer to inspire 
confidence among Algerian Islamists, who have difficulty in identifying with these. A reflection 
in the EU on Islamic political and social values could help dissipate Muslim countries’ 
`impression of cultural imperialism’
23 in Europe’s attempts to promote democracy in the region. 
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Europe should in this sense be open to ‘an Islamic ethic of democracy.’
24 Europe has not 
considered drawing on resources in support of democracy and human rights from within the 
Islamic heritage, such as the concept of shura (fair consultation in a policy-making process), 
respect for law, the central role of moral values such as equality and social justice. It is here that 
Algeria’s Islamists feel that their basic beliefs and political orientations remain poorly 
understood by European governments: 
OK, we are heirs of the Islamist tendency. But today we are inspired by the European 
Christian democrat experience. Islamist is a highly pejorative term  for Europe. Our 
movements are not well understood. I understand myself as a Muslim democrat. Our 
specific Islamic values are indeed universal. I even think that we can be a model for 
Europe’s transforming identity.
25  
Talking about Islamism is the sign of Europe’s ignorance. This is my right to refuse this 
imported distinction between secular parties considered democratic and so-called religious 
parties which should be democratised. Islamic political thought does not differentiate 
between Islamic parties and non Islamic ones. The West is able to develop democratic tools 
such as parties, institutions and parliaments, and I can adopt and use these tools. But it 
doesn’t mean that I am going to give up my Islamic culture and its philosophy in order to 
imitate imperialist and rogue states which call themselves democracies!
26  
Including elements of Islamic philosophy in the arguments in favour of democracy does not, 
however, mean locking this issue into an Islamic framework. What Europe has to avoid in this 
type of approach, however, is reducing democratisation in the South to a sort of intercultural 
dialogue between the two parties, legitimating therein the use of political norms different from 
those applying to political players in the North. It is precisely the argument of an ‘Islamic 
cultural specificity’ that has enabled the authoritarianism of certain Islamist actors and Arab 
states to monopolise Islam as a resource, and to crack down on all attempts at opposition and 
change. Paying heed to the requests of civil societies and what they are trying to build, and thus 
ensuring their representation in institutions in these countries, will consequently be more 
effective than the North's current obsession with the question of ‘Arab reform’, without, 
moreover, managing to identify the reformers. It would also be illusory and superficial to 
consider the Islamists as the new ‘miracle’ political protagonists of the region, after the EU had 
erred in treating them for so long as the ‘untouchables of the democracy assistance world’.
27 
Areas of Potential Collaboration with Europe 
While the West, and in particular the US, is almost unanimously condemned by ‘Arab public 
opinion’ for its policy in the wider Middle East (war in Iraq, support for Israel on the Palestinian 
and Lebanese issues), European administrations have chosen to reflect on their more or less 
official ties with representatives of legalised Islamist movements in the Maghreb and in the 
Middle East since the attacks of 11 September 2001. How, in the space of a decade, did Islamist 
actors who were previously considered enemies become potential dialogue partners? This can 
partly be explained by changing Western strategy in the management of the Islamist 
phenomenon, and partly by the changing position of the Islamists themselves towards the West. 
                                                      
24 Tibi (2005). 
25 Interview with Aboujerra Soltani, leader of the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP).  
26 Interview with Abdallah Djabellah.  
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For the MSP much more than the MNR the new challenge is about developing networks outside 
Algeria via meetings, conferences and seminars where diplomats, politicians, senior civil 
servants and Islamist party officials meet. By developing relations of this kind, party 
representatives can present their often poorly known programme to the outside world – while 
gaining kudos within Algeria as central political actors able to muster international networks 
and support. However, it should be underlined that Islamists in Algeria are not doing it as well 
as their Moroccan neighbours, for example. This isolation is partly due to the Algerian civil war 
of the 1990s. Following these events, a party such as the MNR does not seem to have benefited 
from a renewed interest among European policy makers. The MNR’s marginalisation acted 
clearly to the benefit of the active external work of the MSP which appears as more moderate to 
the West and enjoys assets that the MNR lacks, such as multilingual activists. 
I am not asking anything. I don’t ask people who stigmatise me. I had exchanges with the 
EU in the 1990s but since the national crisis is over and we don’t appear as dangerous for 
their democracy anymore, I feel that they don’t want to learn about what so-called Islamist 
parties really are. They only want to discuss with parties that have renounced their Islamic 
identity.
28 
In the chapter devoted to external relations policies in the 2004 MRN programme for the 
presidential elections,
29 there is coverage of the North African region, Africa, the Islamic space 
and the Arab region, but the MNR does not deal with Europe or even with the West as such. It 
is only under the terms of ‘international organisations’ and the ‘worldwide space’ that a 
partnership with Europe is suggested. ‘Encouraging the culture of dialogue and positive 
reciprocity’, ‘Rejecting nuclear proliferation and preserving peace and security in the 
Mediterranean region’, and ‘Encouraging economic and scientific exchanges’ are for the MNR 
examples of possible areas of collaboration with the EU. 
Alongside Muslim communities present in Europe, there is an effort to establish a political 
dialogue with EU member states both at a structural (parties, policies, trade unions) and 
intellectual or semi-political (think tanks, foundations, universities, among others) level.  
We do have formal exchanges with ambassadors from EU member states in Algeria. 
Encounters outside Algeria are mainly done through our parliamentary roles and do not 
allow us to build direct relationships. Exchanges at an institutional level are still 
complicated but other structures are more yielding such as European political parties, 
European think tanks or foundations. With these structures we have exchanges on the issue 
of reform and not only on the Islamist issue. The European Union should better understand 
why it is not successful in achieving reform in the Arab world and increasing its dialogue 
with the whole civil society. In any case, we are looking for any type of partners in terms of 
dialogue. Cooperation issues will depend on the interests of each other.
30 
This paper has demonstrated that the official entry of Algeria’s Islamist parties into politics has 
had two results: deradicalisation and professionalisation. Having dropped their revolutionary 
trappings and become committed to the political management of the daily problems of their 
voters, these parties should be prepared to participate in cooperation programmes from which 
the EU, in the opinion of a large part of Arab civil societies, should no longer exclude them. 
The partnership that the EU could develop with Islamist parties should relate to sector-specific 
programmes in the region, differentiating the political, social and economic lines of action. 
There is no need to envisage new programmes specifically created for Islamist actors and their 
                                                      
28 Abdellah Djabellah, op. cit. 
29 Harakat al-Islah al Watani, al-Barnamaj al-Siyasi (MNR Political programme), 2004. 
30 Aboujerra Soltani, op. cit. POLITICAL ISLAM IN ALGERIA | 11 
 
organisations but simply to encourage their inclusion in already existing ones. Again, Islamists 
should be considered as political actors. Since Algeria has a long history of cooperation with 
Europe, the interest of its Islamist parties in the policies of the EU is strong, as compared with 
elsewhere in the Middle East. Nevertheless, European policies towards the region are still not 
well-known by Algerian Islamists. So the EU, especially via its delegations in the countries 
concerned, needs to work to increase the visibility of its main programmes such as the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy. It will be particularly 
important to associate grassroots activists and Islamic civil society associations in these training 
activities on Europe. The emphasis should be placed on the political nature of Islamist actors 
and their parties, and thus differentiate the political approach of Islamists from the religious or 
intercultural one. Members of these parties need to acquire specific skills and align their 
experience with international political practices. Exchanges of experiences between Maghreb 
Islamist parties and European foundations and political parties should be promoted both by 
member states at a national level and by the EU as part of Euro-Mediterranean exchanges 
(notably via the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly).  
The EU should promote work to strengthen national institutions that do not exclude Islamist 
parties. Mainly, it is only civil servants chosen by governments who have so far benefited most 
from MEDA programmes to strengthen institutions. Professional norms should be strengthened, 
notably through parliamentary experience, and cooperation with secular parties should be 
strongly encouraged. The broad issue of democratisation should also leave room for joint work 
on specific points where the institutions can address social problems. This cooperation in an 
institutional framework will also allow Islamists to gain credibility by clarifying their positions 
on the so-called ‘grey areas’ – women’s rights, religious minorities, morals in public life, among 
others. 
To ensure that the partnership evolves and continues to concern actors from the South, the EU 
must promote the existence of independent national structures, making it possible to assess, 
criticise and propose adjustments to European policies for the region. The lesson from Algeria’s 
Islamists is that bringing Islamists into this kind of structure would help counter the feeling that 




                                                      
31 For a full comparative analysis between Algerian and Moroccan Islamist parties and their links with the 
EU see:  Boubekeur & Amghar (2006) 
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